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SUMMARY 
Background: A methicillin-resistant Staphylo- 
coccus aureus (MRSA) outbreak occurred in an 
advanced emergency medical service center 
between 2010 and 2011. 
Aim: Our objective was to evaluate the status of 
the MRSA outbreak, as monitored by molecular 
analysis. 
Methods: Twenty-eight MRSA strains were 
isolated from the blood of 11 patients, and from 
other specimens (pharynx, nasal cavity, etc) of 12 
patients, the environments, and the skin, middle 
nutus and urine of each one patient from other 
wards. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) 
was performed to evaluate horizontal trans- 
mission. 
Results: Molecular typing by PFGE showed the 
28 MRSA strains had 7 patterns, and the PFGE 
patterns of the 11 MRSA strains were identical. 
Unselective use of intranasal mupirocin ointment, 
MRSA monitoring for new inpatients and the 
prevention of direct or indirect contact infection 
were performed. However, the number of in- 
patients with MRSA did not quickly decreased, 
and additional molecular typing by PFGE showed 
10 of 19 MRSA strains (5 of 6 from blood, 5 of 
13 from other specimens) were still identical. 
Lectures and ward rounds were performed 
repeatedly, and participation in ward rounds by 
staffs was suggested. Finally, the number of 
inpatients with MRSA was significantly 
decreased more than 6 months after the 
intervention. Although the MRSA outbreak was 
thought to have ended, follow-up molecular 
typing by PFGE showed horizontal transmission 
persisted. 
Conclusion: our data suggest that various and 
combined measures of infection control are 
essential and monitoring by molecular analysis 
using PFGE is useful to identify the status of a 
MRSA outbreak. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
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(MRSA) is a major causative organism of 
hospital-acquired infection. MRSA strains easily 
colonize a host, particularly immunodeficient 
patients, and can cause a variety of serious 
infections [1-3]. The principal mode of 
transmission is via the transiently colonized 
hands of hospital personnel [4]. An outbreak of 
MRSA in intensive care units or neonatal 
intensive care units is often prolonged and can 
result in substantial morbidity and mortality [5, 6]. 
Although there are reports concerning the 
efficacy of unselective use of intranasal 
mupirocin ointment to control MRSA outbreak [7, 
8], effective infection control measures still have 
not been established. 
  Molecular analysis is essential for the 
evaluation of horizontal transmission during a 
MRSA outbreak, and pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis (PFGE) remains to be the gold 
standard [9-11]. 
  We describe the control of a MRSA outbreak in 
our advanced emergency medical service center 
(hereafter referred to as the ICU) through early 
recognition of the outbreak, monitoring by 
molecular analysis and the stepwise addition of 
infection control measures. 
 
METHODS 
 
Ethical Approval 
  All studies described herein had been approved 
by the Human Ethics Review Boards of Kurume 
University (10268). 
 
Setting and Outbreak description 
  In Kurume university hospital, there are 29 
diagnosis and treatment departments, and 25 
wards with 1,098 beds including an ICU with 44 
beds. The number of monthly patients with newly 
identified MRSA colonization or infections 
including a blood-culture positive in the ICU had 
increased beginning in June, 2010 (Figure 1). 
Since an outbreak is defined as at least twice the 
usual number of cases in the same ward, the 
Infection Control Team (ICT) started the 
intervention for a MRSA outbreak in the ICU 
beginning in August, 2010.  
 
Figure 1. Transition of monthly patients with newly identified MRSA colonization or infection including blood culture positive 
in the ICU from January, 2008 to December, 2011. MRSA cases with blood culture positive patients in the ICU dramatically 
increased from June, 2010. As a result of having performed various kinds of interventions, the occurrence of MRSA infections 
was decreased more than 6 months after intervention was begun. 
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Bacterial strains and patients 
  The first PFGE was performed against 28 
MRSA isolates from the blood (11 strains) of 11 
patients, and from other specimens (pharynx, 
nasal cavity, stool, sputum, ascites and pus) of 12 
patient (12 strains), the environments (2 strains), 
and the skin, middle nutus and urine of each one 
patient (3 strains) from other wards between April 
and September, 2010. Since the number of 
inpatients with MRSA had not decreased quickly 
despite various infection control measures such as 
unselective use of intranasal mupirocin ointment 
to inpatients, MRSA monitoring for new 
inpatients and measures for the prevention of 
direct or indirect contact were performed, A 
second PFGE was performed against 19 MRSA 
isolates from blood, sputum, nasal cavity, skin 
and pus in the ICU, and each of 3 MRSA strains 
in neurosurgery, reconstructive and maxillofacial 
surgery and cardiovasucular medicine where 
inpatients were occasionally transferred from the 
ICU between October, 2010 and January, 2011. 
Finally, even after the end of the MRSA outbreak 
in the ICU a follow-up PFGE was performed 
against 28 MRSA isolates from blood, nasal 
cavities, sputum, pus, pharynx, catheter tip and 
ascites in the ICU between August and November, 
2011. 
 
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis 
  PFGE was performed as described previously 
[1]. The DNA were digested with SmaI (Takara 
Shuzo Co., Shiga, Japan). CHEF Mapper Pulsed 
Field Electrophoresis Systems (Bio-Rad Life 
Science Group, Hercules, CA, USA) were used 
for the electrophoresis, with a potential of 6 V/cm, 
switch times of 0.47 and 63 seconds, and a 
run-time of 20 hours and 18 minutes. After 
staining with ethidium bromide, the interpretation 
of PFGE patterns was based on the criteria 
described by Tenover et al [12].  
 
Intervention by the ICT 
  A weekly MRSA monitoring culture for all 
inpatients in the ICU was continued from August, 
2010, and environmental bacterial culture in 38 
locations in the ICU were done in September, 
2010. MRSA was detected in 2 of the 38 
locations (5.3%) around MRSA colonized 
patients. As molecular analysis by the first PFGE 
Figure 2. Post-intervention improvements by the ICT. Left: Organizing a desk for injection manufacture. Center: Clarification of 
waste containers. Right: Placement of a  rack for gloves and gowns. 
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showed the horizontal transmission of MRSA 
strains in the ICU, the ICT began the following 
measures: 1) active surveillance and unselective 
use of intranasal mupirocin ointment to all 
inpatients for 3 days beginning in November, 
2010, 2) reinforcement of direct or indirect 
contact infection measures, 3) Reinforcement of 
blood stream infection measures, and 4) action to 
monitor reinforcement by ICT and education for 
the ICU staffs (Figure 2). 
 
RESULTS 
 
Interpretation of PFGE 
  Molecular typing by the first PFGE showed 28 
MRSA strains had 7 patterns, and the PFGE 
pattern b of 11 MRSA strains (blood in 6, 
environment in 2, and pharynx, ascites and pus in 
one each) were identical, which meant that the 
horizontal transmission of a predominant PFGE 
pattern b of the MRSA strains had occurred in the 
ICU (Figure 3). 
  Molecular typing by a second PFGE which 
was performed during the MRSA outbreak 
showed 19 MRSA strains in the ICU had 7 
patterns, and 10 of the 19 MRSA strains (5 of 6 in 
blood, 5 of 13 in other specimens) were still the 
predominant PFGE pattern b (Figure 4). 
Moreover, the predominant PFGE pattern b of 
MRSA strain was confirmed in the patients who 
were transferred from the ICU to neurosurgery 
and reconstructive and maxillofacial surgery 
ward, which meant that the MRSA outbreak had 
potentially spread from the ICU to other wards. 
  Molecular typing by the follow-up PFGE even 
after the end of the MRSA outbreak in the ICU 
showed 28 MRSA strains had 7 patterns, and that 
21 of 28 MRSA strains (2 of 4 in blood, 19 of 24 
in other specimens) were still the PFGE pattern b 
(Figure 5), which meant that the horizontal 
transmission of the predominant PFGE pattern b 
of MRSA strains had continued even after the end 
of the MRSA outbreak in the ICU. 
 
Additional intervention by ICT 
  The ICT performed various kinds of inter- 
vention for the prevention of MRSA outbreak in 
the ICU, as described above. However, the 
Figure 3. PFGE patterns of Sma I digested DNAs of MRSA isolates between April and September, 2010. Molecular typing of 
the first PFGE showed 28 MRSA strains had 7 patterns, and the PFGE patterns of 11 MRSA strains (blood in 6, environment in 
2, and pharynx, ascites and pus in each one) were identical、and the predominant PFGE pattern b was not confirmed in other 
wards (No. 26-28). 
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number of inpatients with MRSA did not quickly 
decrease. Lectures and ward rounds were 
repeatedly done, and participation in the ward 
rounds by the ICU staffs members was suggested 
to enhance the precaution against the MRSA 
outbreak. As a result of having performed various 
kinds of intervention, the number of inpatients 
with MRSA was significantly decreased more 
than 6 months later (Figure1). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
  MRSA outbreak occasionally occur as the 
result of hospital acquired infection in a hospital, 
particularly in intensive care units [13], neonatal 
intensive care unit [6] or burns unit [14], and 
often prolong and increase the incidences of 
hospital acquired pneumonia, blood stream 
infection and the risk of death [5]. Since the 
MRSA strain is known to spread in a ward via the 
transiently colonized hands of hospital personel 
[4], hand hygiene is a basic preventive measure 
[15]. Although a previous report demonstrated 
that simple control measures including contact 
isolation of colonized patients and reinforcement 
of hand washing practices among personnel has 
effectively controlled MRSA outbreaks [13], 
some specific preventive measure such as 
unselective use of intranasal mupirocin ointment 
[7, 8], and enteral vancomycin [16, 17] has 
eventually been used in clinical settings in the 
past. Indeed, various kinds of interventions 
including the unselective use of intranasal 
mupirocin ointment to control MRSA outbreaks 
in the ICU have been performed. However, the 
number of inpatients with MRSA was not 
decreased quickly, and the MRSA outbreak ended 
after additional interventions such as repeated 
lectures and ward rounds, and participation of 
ward rounds by the ICU staffs to enhance their 
precautions against further MRSA outbreaks. 
  During this particular MRSA outbreak, 
molecular analysis by PFGE was repeatedly 
performed to evaluate the horizontal transmission 
Figure 4. PFGE patterns of Sma I digested DNAs of MRSA isolates between October, 2010 and January, 2011. Molecular typing 
by a second PFGE showed 19 MRSA strains in the ICU had 7 patterns, and 10 of the 19 MRSA strains (5 of 6 in blood, 5 of 13 
in other specimens) continued to be the predominant PFGE pattern b. The predominant PFGE pattern b of MRSA strains was 
confirmed in the patients who were transferred from the ICU to neurosurgery and reconstructive and to maxillofacial surgery 
wards (No. 23 and 26). 
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and the ICU staffs were immediately informed of 
the results. PFGE seems to be useful in 
evaluating the presence of cross-transmission in 
hospital- acquired infection [9-11]. In addition, 
previous study indicates that PFGE studies may 
be helpful in assessing the effectiveness of 
interventions during a MRSA outbreak [18]. In 
our study, a predominant MRSA isolate was 
thought to be spread in the ICU via the transiently 
colonized hands of hospital personnel. However, 
the follow-up PFGE even after the end of the 
MRSA outbreak in the ICU showed that the 
predominant MRSA isolate continued to spread 
as a horizontal transmission, although the number 
of inpatients with newly identified MRSA 
colonization or infections had decreased. That 
means that the predominant MRSA strain could 
potentially cause another MRSA outbreak in the 
ICU, and, therefore, the precautions should be 
continued.  
  In conclusion, our data suggest that various 
and combined measures of infection control are 
essential against a MRSA outbreak and that 
monitoring by molecular analysis using PFGE is 
useful in identifying the status of a MRSA 
outbreak. Therefore, the use of follow-up 
PFGE―even after the end of a MRSA 
outbreak―should be considered in order to 
prevent a recurrence. 
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